Renunciation of Testamentary Benefit as Fraudulent Transfer by Gamin, Dean David
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 1
1986
Renunciation of Testamentary Benefit as
Fraudulent Transfer
Dean David Gamin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Dean David Gamin, Renunciation of Testamentary Benefit as Fraudulent Transfer, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 148 (1987)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol37/iss1/8
RENUNCIATION OF TESTAMENTARY BENEFIT
AS FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
For various reasons, the intended recipient of a testamentary benefit sometimes
chooses not to accept. If the intended recipient is an insolvent debtor, such a renunci-
ation may deny his creditor a potential source offund. Some creditors have success-
fully attacked this sort of renunciation as a fraudulent transfer, even though the
debtor never owns the benefit ostensibly transferred. The author considers whether
the renunciation ought to be treated as a fraudulent transfer and concludes, contrary
to a recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, that it should not
INTRODUCTION
The right, especially, to harry and bedevil
one's creditor is inestimable!*
MAY A CREDITOR force his debtor to accept a gratuitous
transfer so that the creditor may levy upon the property in satis-
faction of his claim? Posed more specifically, and perhaps less argu-
mentatively, may renunciation of property passing by succession be
the subject of a fraudulent transfer?1 While a renunciation is most
commonly motivated by a desire to minimize taxes of various sorts,2
it has also been effected, with a disparity of results, to avoid the
subjection of the benefit to the claims of creditors of the
beneficiary.'
Conflicting state judgments indicate that the issue requires a bal-
ancing of two competing interests: not forcing an unwanted gift on
an unwilling recipient, and providing payment to the creditors of
the debtor/beneficiary.4
* Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 708 (1879).
1. A glossary of the terminology used in this Note might prove helpful. Renunciation
and disclaimer are used interchangeably to mean the rejection of a gift or testamentary bene-
fit. Testamentary benefit and beneficiary are generic terms meaning gift by virtue of another's
death, and the taker of that gift, respectively. Heirs take an inheritance of real property
through intestate succession. Devisees take a devise of real property through testate succes-
sion. Distributees take a distribution of personal property when there has been no will, and
legatees take a legacy or bequest of personal property from a will. See generally 1 BOWE-
PARKER: PAGE ON WILLS §§ 1.3-.4 (rev. ed. 1960).
2. Roche, General Comments and Implications of TRA 1976, PROB. NOTES 20 (Spring
1978).
3. See infra notes 28-106 and accompanying text.
4. E.g., compare In re Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d 204, 207-08, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (Sup.
Ct. 1982) ("distributee may freely renounce.., for any reason or for no reason"); Bradford v.
Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 59, 109 S.W. 502, 504 (1907) (acceptance or renunciation is "option-
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The problem also involves the classification of the beneficiary's
interest in being named in a will, and the effect to be accorded his
renunciation of that interest. A will is ambulatory-absolutely rev-
ocable--and being named as a beneficiary is commonly thought to
"represent nothing more than an abstract desire for the decedent's
property or a unilateral expectation of a right to it."6 Still, interfer-
ence with that expectation through fraud provides a tort cause of
action.7 Moreover, the beneficiary of an unprobated will has been
recognized to have an inchoate right, a "legally protected interest,"
that falls short of a vested property right, but is nevertheless ac-
corded fifth and fourteenth amendment due process protection.' In
the leading case suggesting that renunciation may be a fraudulent
transfer,9 Justice Traynor went so far as to assert that "when a tes-
tator dies, the legatee obtains a power, in itself a limited right of
ownership... to determine the ultimate disposition of the property
"1I0
If the disclaimer of a benefit is viewed as the relinquishment of a
property right of some or any type, it dovetails rather neatly into
ary with the devisee") with In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 814, 108 P.2d 401, 404 (1940)
(if the claims of creditors would be defeated, debtor's wish to renounce becomes "subservient
to his obligations"); Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio St. 3d 305, 307, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (1985)
("renunciation when done to defraud a creditor is susceptible to attack by the creditor").
5. 1 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 3.
6. Alexander & Pearson, Alternative Models of Ante-Mortem Probate and Procedural
Due Process Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L. REv. 89, 107 (1979) (paraphrasing Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979): "One who by fraud, duress or
other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an
inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other for
loss of the inheritance or gift."; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at
1007 (5th ed. 1984) ("The problem appears in reality to be one of satisfactory proof that the
loss has been suffered, instead of the existence of a ground of tort liability.").
8. Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 201-02, 223 S.E.2d 445, 448-49 (1976) (quoting Schroe-
der v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962)). In a year's support challenge to the
defendant's holding ofdevised realty, the defendant had no notice of the proceeding. The due
process challenge to the judgment against her was upheld because then-existing GA. CODE
ANN. § 113-801 (1933) provided that "[u]pon the death of the owner of realty testate, the
devisees have an inchoate title in the realty .... This inchoate title had been recognized as
an assignable property interest and as subject to voluntary or fraudulent conveyance. "[T]he
defendant's interest in the real property as a devisee under the will is a legally protected
interest" and notice of the challenge to her inchoate title was therefore required by due pro-
cess. Allan at 202, 223 S.E.2d at 449.
9. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940) (debtor's renunciation ad-
mittedly made to deflect property from creditor to brother held nullified).
10. Id. at 811, 108 P.2d at 403 (emphasis added). Justice Traynor found this power
"essentially analogous to a power of appointment" and held that the debtor's renunciation
was a fraudulent conveyance. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. Kalt has been
legislatively overruled. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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what would be a transfer of that property right and, when done to
hinder, delay or defraud creditors, what would be a fraudulent
transfer.1 Conversely, the renunciation of an "abstract desire for
the decedent's property" is simply a manifestation of intent not to
pursue that desire and so cannot be a transfer-fraudulent or bona
fide-in any sense. Labeling a disclaimer a "transfer" or a "convey-
ance," however, is misleading because these terms do not exclu-
sively encompass what may be a fraudulent conveyance. The
proper test has been stated as the "unjust diminution of the debtor's
estate."12 This analysis is premised on the general rule that insol-
vent debtors cannot alienate their property with impunity so as to
put it beyond the reach of creditors.13
11. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
12. 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 195, at 348 (rev.
ed. 1940).
13. The law's concern with fraudulent conveyances is, of course, nothing new. The
well-known Statute of Elizabeth, 1571, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 condemned those transfers, which had
become "more commonly used and practised in these days than hath been seen or heard of
heretofore ...." Id. The Statute of Elizabeth was most famously applied in a criminal
prosecution by Lord Coke in Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601). Twyne's Case identified
several marks or badges of fraud that would identify a transfer made with the actual "malice,
fraud, covin, collusion or guile, to the end, purpose and intent, to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors," 13 Eliz., ch.5, and thus allow the defrauded creditor to set aside the transfer as
"clearly and utterly void." Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 816.
In Twyne's Case itself, and ever since that judgment, courts have adjudged instances
whereby the fraudulent intent of a transferor will be presumed in law. However, in 1918, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recognized that "the courts
... in equity [had] pushed presumption of fraud as a fact to an unwarranted extent; with the
result that, while in the main the decisions under the facts do justice, the reasoning support-
ing them leaves much to be desired." UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A.
427, 428 (1985) (Prefatory Note). Citing this recognition as one reason for their actions, the
Commissioners drafted and approved the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA),
which incorporated not only the Statute of Elizabeth, but also particular instances of fraudu-
lent intent to be presumed in law "without regard to ... actual intent." Id. §§ 4-5. These
instances include conveyances for less than fair consideration when the debtor is or will
thereby be rendered insolvent, Id. § 4, and when the debtor "intends or believes that he will
incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature." Id. § 6. Section 7 of the UFCA retains
the substance of the Statute of Elizabeth: "Every conveyance made and every obligation
incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or
defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future credi-
tors." Id. § 7. The UFCA also defines insolvency, Id. § 2, fair consideration, Id. § 3, and
creditors, who are "person[s] having any claim," Id. § 1, and which is universally recognized
to include tort claimants. See cases collected in 7A U.L.A. 427, 439; see also Stein v. Brown,
18 Ohio St. 3d 305, 308, 480 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (1985) ("[a]n individual possessing a cause of
action in tort is a 'creditor' . ..."). The UFCA also spells out the relief a matured or
unmatured creditor may seek as against a fraudulent conveyance. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CON-
VEYANCE ACT §§ 9-10, 7A U.L.A. 427, 577 (1985). To date, twenty-four states, including
Ohio, have adopted the UFCA. Id. at 14 (Supp. 1986).
In 1984, the Commissioners, influenced by reforms in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, revisions in the Model Corporation Act, effects on the UFCA of the Uniform Commer-
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In Stein v. Brown,14 the Ohio Supreme Court recently evaluated
whether renunciation of a testamentary benefit may be a fraudulent
transfer. Without much discussion or analysis, the Court aspired
to join the "ever-increasing number of states" that treat the renunci-
ation of a testamentary benefit to defeat creditors as a fraudulent
transfer. 15
Unfortunately, the issue presented to the court in Stein was
laden with a fact situation that could not be charitably viewed. The
disclaimant was facing a wrongful death action by the mother and
administratrix of a young boy. The disclaimant had lost concious-
ness while driving under the influence of alcohol, and had careened
onto a sidewalk. On the day that the boy died from his injuries, the
disclaimant transferred his interest in his residential property to his
wife for one dollar. (Although this transfer was apparently not at
issue, the court deemed it '"prima facie fraudulent" based on the
"grossly inadequate consideration.") 6 During the pendency of the
lawsuit, the disclaimant's brother died, leaving a valid will that
would have bequeathed $100,000 to the disclaimant. Ten months
after the accident, and with the suit still pending, the defendant dis-
claimed the bequest in accordance with Ohio statute.17 The probate
court nullified the renunciation, but the court of appeals allowed it.
The Ohio Supreme Court, on a motion to certify the record, re-
versed, holding the renunciation a fraudulent transfer, and noting,
"[w]hen viewed with the totality of the circumstances herein, we
simply cannot condone such action." 8
The circumstances of the case were indeed reprehensible, but
cial Code, avoidance of foreclosures on security interests, and Model Rules of Professional
Conduct proscriptions against counseling or assisting a client in fraudulent conduct, promul-
gated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). UNIE. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT,
7A U.L.A. 639-40 (1985) (Prefatory Note). The new name of the act is meant to clarify its
applicability to transfers of personal property as well as real property ("'conveyance' having
a connotation ... of personal property") Id. at 640. "The basic structure and approach of
the [UFCA] are preserved in the [UFTA]." To date, only Hawaii, North Dakota and Oregon
have adopted it. Id. at 20 (Supp. 1986).
14. 18 Ohio St. 3d 305, 480 N.E.2d 1121 (1985).
15. Id. at 307, 480 N.E.2d at 1123. The court cited four cases as indicative of the recent
"trend," only one of which was directly on point. The cited cases: United States v. Johnson,
245 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. Ark. 1965) (fraudulent transfer of owned property; no testamentary
benefit involved); Jahner v. Jacob, 252 N.W.2d I (N.D. 1977) (same); Montana Nat'l Bank v.
Michaels, 631 P.2d 1260 (Mont. 1981) (fraudulent transfer of held property, no testamentary
benefit involved); In re Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 587 (Wyo. 1977) (renunciation of testamen-
tary benefit held fraudulent transfer; vigorous dissent).
16. Stein, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 309, 480 N.E.2d at 1124.
17. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.60 (Baldwin 1985).
18. Stein, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 309, 480 N.E.2d at 1124.
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when viewed as an adopted rule of law based upon the cited prece-
dents, the renunciation ought not to have been so quickly censured.
The Stein court relied heavily upon In re Kalt's Estate ' 9 wherein
Justice Traynor, faced with facts not nearly as gruesome, found the
power to disclaim "essentially analogous to a general power of ap-
pointment under a will,"2 and subject to the scrutiny of the fraudu-
lent conveyance statutes. Justice Holmes, in Stein, went one better
to find that "the power to vest title in another is the equivalent of a
transfer."'" At the time of the Stein decision, however, Kalt had
been legislatively overruled,22 and the decision was at least implic-
itly imperiled for some seven years.23
This Note will survey the postures taken on this question which
is, outside of the bankruptcy context, one of state law.24 It will also
critically evaluate the positions taken, consider some statutory pro-
visions that are relevant to the problem, and defend the position
that renunciation ought not to be viewed as a fraudulent transfer.
Part I of this Note analyzes and refutes the cases and reasonings
behind the disallowance of renunciation to defeat creditors.25 Part
II considers the allowance of renunciation for any or for no reason,
at the absolute discretion of the beneficiary. 6 Part III raises some
collateral considerations in support of the absolute and private right
of renunciation.27
I. DEBTORS CANNOT USE RENUNCIATIONS
TO DEFEAT CREDITORS
The "ever-increasing number of states"28 to have held that debt-
19. 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940).
20. Id. at 812, 108 P.2d at 403.
21. Stein, 18 Ohio St. 3d at 307, 480 N.E.2d at 1123.
22. CAL. PROB. CODE § 283 (West 1986): "A disclaimer is not a fraudulent conveyance
by the beneficiary under [the fraudulent conveyance provisions]." The 1983 addition to the
California Law Revision Committee Reports reads: "Section 283 rejects the rule of Estate of
Kalt ......
23. Martin, Perspectives on Federal Disclaimer Legislation, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 316, 320
n.14 (1979) ("There is some question whether the holding in Kalt remains valid, however, in
light of a more recent California statute, CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.6 (West Supp. 1978) [now
CAL. PROB. CODE § 282(a) (West 1986): "A disclaimer relates back for all purposes to the
date of the death of the creator of the disclaimed interest . , that expressly endorses
relation-back when property is disclaimed.").
24. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are created and
defined by state law.").
25. See infra notes 28-65 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 70-98 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
28. Stein, 18 Ohio St.3d at 305, 408 N.E.2d at 1123.
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ors cannot use renunciation to defeat creditors draw their conclu-
sions from a variety of considerations.
At first blush, it must be conceded that the renunciation of a
testamentary benefit to defeat creditors seems unjust; a debtor, after
all, is bound in good conscience to make good his debts. While it is
indisputable that the creditor may exact the repayment from any
available nonexempt assets of the debtor,29 the decisions described
below have all essentially made assets available contrary to the
wishes of the debtor and the presumed intent of the testator.
Among the justifications offered for refusal to give effect to re-
nunciations are archaic distinctions between takers by descent and
by devise,3" convenient legal presumptions developed principally in
an inapposite context,31 strained analogy to property-like powers of
appointment, 32 and finally, justifiably applied estoppels. 33
A. Inability to Reject Inheritance
At common law, an heir could not disclaim his intestate share of
an estate.34 On the other hand, takers by devise have enjoyed the
right to renounce .3  Traditionally, distinctions existed between tak-
ers by devise and by descent,36 based upon either feudalism,37 or the
designation of the beneficiary by statutory operation of intestate
succession laws rather than by the testator.38 However, this distinc-
tion has so often been criticized as lacking a logical justification 39
that the great majority of states now allow, by statute, disclaimer of
property, however devolved.'
29. Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to
Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615,
615 (1978).
30. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
34. 6 BOWE-PARKER, supra note I § 49.1.
35. Id.
36. UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL, INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENT ACT,
8A U.L.A. 93, 97 (1983) (comments).
37. Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 NW. U.L. REV. 568, 569 (1953).
38. Rohan, Practice Commentary to N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11, at
260 (McKinney 1981).
39. Eg., 6 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1 § 49.1; Lauritzen, supra note 37, at 569 ("To
distinguish logically between the right to renounce of a legatee in contrast to that of an heir is
an exercise in futility.").
40. ALA. CODE § 43-8-291 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.295 (1985); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2801 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-3201 (1985); CAL. PROB. CODE § 275
(West 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-801 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-300
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The effect of this doctrine of "descent cast,"4 where it is still
applied, is to transform what would be a renunciation into a con-
veyance by the disclaimant to the next taker. Descent cast vests
title in the heir at the moment of the decedent's death; any at-
tempted renunciation cannot prevent the estate from descending to
the heir, if only for the time it takes to convey it.4'
The nearly universal rejection of the doctrine must be taken as a
recognition of the strong interest in not forcing unwanted property
upon an unwilling recipient. The legislative reversal of the common
law rule, by canon of construction, should be strictly interpreted
and should support renunciation regardless of motive.
B. Presumption of Acceptance of Beneficial Gifts
Another possible rationale for denying effect to renunciations is
the historical presumption of acceptance of a beneficial gift. This
presumption is sometimes codified.43 Beneficial gifts have been pre-
sumed to vest in the grantee without his knowledge or consent.'
Conclusive presumptions of acceptance are applied to beneficial
(West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 601 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732-801 (West 1986);
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-115 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-801 (1984); IDAHO CODE
§ 15-2-801 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 2-7 (Smith-Hurd 1986); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 32-3-2-2 (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.704 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
2291 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394-610 (Baldwin 1978); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 977
(West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 2-801 (1981); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. § 9-201 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191(A), § 2 (West 1986); MiCH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 554.501 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.532 (West 1975 & 1986
Supp.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.490 (Vernon 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2352 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 120.020 (1981); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRuSTrS LAW § 2-1.11 (McKinney
1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-10 & 31B-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-01 (1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.60 (Baldwin 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, §§ 23-26
(West 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.652 (1985); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6201 (Purdon
1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-5-2 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-37-40 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-4-29 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-103 (1986); TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-801 (1978); VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-188 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.86.020 (1986); W. VA. CODE § 42-6-
2 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.40 (West 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 2-1-401 (1980).
One notable exception to the right to refuse to accept property is the law of Texas. In
Texas, property devolving by will or by intestacy vests immediately in the beneficiary, whose
title is subject to the payment of debts of the estate and to the possession of the administrator
or executor. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon 1986).
41. The doctrine of descent cast denies the ability to renounce an intestate share. Lau-
ritzen, supra note 37, at 572.
42. 6 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1 § 49.1.
43. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1059(2) (West 1986) ("[The requirement of delivery is con-
structively met] [w]here it is delivered to a stranger for the benefit of the grantee, and his
assent is shown, or may be presumed.").
44. 6 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1 § 49.7.
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conveyances to persons legally incapable of acceptance, such as in-
fants45 and the mentally incompetent.46 Following this reasoning, a
testamentary benefit could be presumed to have been accepted by
the beneficiary, and a subsequent renunciation would therefore be a
transfer of an owned interest.
The presumed acceptance itself is necessary only because the
American rule requires acceptance as a condition to valid and effec-
tive title-vesting.47 By contrast, English courts have long recog-
nized the opposite possibility that "property may be thrust in a
transferee without his knowledge or consent."48
Professor Hohfeld would support the English rule with the ob-
servation that legal ability or power is one's capacity to change an-
other's legal status, and that this may obviously be done without the
other's knowledge or consent.49 To use Hohfeld's example, A's
abandonment of his watch creates, simultaneously and correla-
tively, without knowledge or consent, a power in every other person
to acquire the watch by appropriation. But this admitted truth fails
to distinguish between rights and freedoms. Interference with a
freedom is less onerous than interference with a right.50 The power
to acquire the abandoned watch is a freedom, not a right, and no
Johnny-Come-Lately to the watch could allege any injury inflicted
by the first finder. Hohfeld's power, consequently, is not thrust
upon anyone, for its disregard is exactly equivalent to its nonexis-
tence. Likewise, an assertion of disclaimer is not the rejection of a
property right thrust upon the unwilling, without knowledge or
consent. It is the refusal to pursue a potential right-a freedom-
which the disclaimant could have, but disregards and accurately
does not.
45. McKinnon v. First Nat. Bank of Pensacola, 77 Fla. 777, 780, 82 So. 748, 749 (1919)
(deposits into bank account to credit of an infant; "[w]here a gift made to an infant is benefi-
cial and not burdensome the law will presume acceptance.").
46. Pohl v. Fulton, 86 Kan. 14, 17, 119 P. 716, 717 (1911) (disputed ownership of note;
"[t]he law presumes the acceptance of a beneficial gift to one who is mentally incapable of
accepting it .... ).
47. Note, Renunciation of a Devise in Fraud of Creditors as a Fraudulent Conveyance, 27
VA. L. REV. 936, 936 (1941).
48. Id at 936 n.2.
49. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 44 (1913).
50. See Rosenfeld, Between Rights and Consequences: A Philosophical Inquiry into the
Foundations of Legal Ethics in the Changing World of Securities Regulation, 49 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 462 (1981). "If I have a right to the fruits of a tree, I am entitled to such fruit. If
anyone else takes that fruit for himself, I suffer a wrong. If, on the other hand, I am only free
to take the fruit, someone else taking it does not constitute a wrong against me .. " Id. at
510.
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Because the law requires, and has found it convenient to pre-
sume, acceptance of a gift, the argument has been advanced that
creditors, too, should be allowed to rely upon the presumption. 1
But unless the expectancy of a testamentary benefit is advanced by
the beneficiary as a source of repayment, the creditor must know
that the gift is merely an expectancy, subject to revocation by the
testator and to renunciation by the beneficiary. 2
Although the general American requirement of acceptance, and
the "double fiction" of presumed acceptance, has been criticized5 3
(and any general formal acceptance requirement would be obvi-
ously impractical) perhaps a certificate of acceptance would not be
too difficult a requirement for testamentary benefits. Such a re-
quirement could be easily implemented because all interested par-
ties are known to the probate court. The formal acceptance would
be conclusive evidence of the disposition of the estate, serve to im-
press upon the beneficiary the available choices, and, most impor-
tant, eliminate any uncertainty relative to a possible later
renunciation.
C. Analogy to Power of Appointment
The renunciation viewed as a fraudulent transfer finds its
strongest support in In re Kalt's Estate.54 The debtor/legatee in
Kalt disclaimed his testamentary share for the express purposes of
defeating two writs of attachment levied upon the property, and de-
flecting the property to his brother. The debts were pursued by the
administrator of the creditor's estate and were doubtless thought of
by the debtor as something less than an absolute obligation. The
California Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Traynor, recog-
nized three exceptions to the then-generally accepted right to re-
nounce even as against creditors,55 and went on to find that the
"power... to determine the ultimate disposition of the property [is]
essentially analogous to a power of appointment under a will,"
51. "A creditor is not over-rash in shaping his own action by a presumption [of accept-
ance] which the law itself indulges. When he has so done, can the donee, his debtor, step in
and by mere whim or caprice defeat him?" Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 707 (1879).
52. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
53. "[Tlhere is no intrinsic difficulty in regarding a conveyance as effective to vest prop-
erty in the grantee even before the latter has consented to receive it." 4 H. TIFFANY, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1055, at 456 (3d. ed. 1975). Tiffany criticizes the requirement
that acceptance is necessary. Id. § 1058, at 463.
54. 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940).
55. Id. at 809, 108 P.2d at 402.
[Vol. 37:148
RENUNCIATION AS FRA UDULENT TRANSFER
which cannot be used to defeat creditors. 6 The debtor owning a
power of appointment must assign the property to himself (though
this is undoubtedly opposed to the donor's intent) and thus subject
the property to creditors' claims, or assign the property to the credi-
tor and directly satisfy the creditor's claims. Assignment to a third
party, in fraud of creditors, may be treated as a fraudulent convey-
ance.5 7 All these assertions are true and proper because the holder
of a power of appointment selects the transferee. 8 However, the
analogy to renunciation fails because
the renouncing party is simply the catalyst for diverting the re-
nounced interest from the hands of creditors. It is not he, but
rather the renunciation statute, which treats the renouncing
party as though he had predeceased the testator or decedent, in
conjunction with the will or the statute of intestacy, as the case
may be, which determines the ultimate disposition of the diverted
property.
59
The disclaimant has, therefore, only a limited power to determine
who will take the property-either himself (and immediately subse-
quently, his creditors) or someone else whom he cannot choose, the
choice having been made in the residuary clause or by the statutes
of intestacy.
While disclaimed property commonly does deflect to some fa-
vored recipient--children, spouses, siblings-the essential distinc-
tion is that the recipient is selected by one other than the debtor.
Therefore, his act of renunciation is not precisely a transfer of bene-
fit to them, but a denial of benefit to himself.
D. Estoppel to Renounce
The refusal to give effect to a renunciation has also been based
upon an estoppel, where the debtor has, by some act, indicated an
implicit acceptance of the legacy. 0 Thus, debtors who have resided
for many years on property subsequently devised to them, only to
disclaim with creditors closing in, have been estopped from re-
nouncing the devise.6 ' A similar result would follow when the
56. Id. at 811-12, 108 P.2d at 403.
57. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 12 § 158, at 290.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 11.1 (1984):
"A power of appointment is authority, other than as an incident of the beneficial ownership
of property, to designate recipients of beneficial interests in property."
59. Estate of Schiffman, 105 Misc. 2d 1025, 1027-28, 430 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231 (1980).
60. See generally cases collected in Annotation, What Constitutes or Establishes Benefici-
ary's Acceptance or Renunciation of Devise or Bequest, 93 A.L.R.2d 834 (1964).
61. Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697 (1879) (twenty years); Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556,
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debtor has paid taxes in his own name on the property.62 Other
sorts of implied acceptances that justly preclude later renunciation
are attempts to assign the property to another,63 and compliance
with the conditions of a bequest. 64 There can be no quarrel with
these decisions, for the right to renounce65 is undermined by a
debtor's representation that property is his own and thus available
to satisfy his debts.
II. RENUNCIATION MAY BE EFFECTED TO DEFEAT CREDITORS
The right to renounce should ordinarily be denied only in the
case where it is reasonably certain that the debtor has manifested a
prior acceptance.66 By never having accepted property, the debtor
never enjoys it, never augments his estate, cannot direct the prop-
erty to a certain chosen recipient, and does not own an asset that is
unjustly unavailable to his creditors. Many cases have, indeed,
respected renunciations.
The long-accepted general rule prior to the 1940 Kalt decision,
which may be taken to have the implied acceptance of the text-
writers,67 has been to recognize and give effect to the absolute right
of renunciation even as against creditors. Even so, there were ex-
ceptions to this right. These exceptions included estoppels, where
the debtor had done some act inconsistent with a later renunciation,
and which were earlier in this Note conceded to be justifiably ap-
plied,68 and instances of collusion between the disclaimant and the
ultimate taker. It has been suggested that collusion, while difficult
to prove, probably exists in nearly all such disclaimer cases. 69 If
collusion does indeed exist, in the sense of consideration passing to
the disclaimant for his act of renunciation, this too, would be justifi-
164 P. 1100 (1917) (six years); Crumpler v. Barfield & Wilson Co., 114 Ga. 570, 40 S.E. 808
(1902) (thirteen years; disclaimer two months after levy).
62. Fink v. Stein, 158 Pa. Super. 464, 45 A.2d 249 (1946) (devisee's guardian, without
express acceptance, paid taxes, and leased and accounted for proceeds of farm).
63. Johnson v. The Connecticut Bank, 21 Conn. 148 (1851) (legatee allowed another
family to move into and occupy home and furnishings).
64. In re Snell's Estate, 30 Misc. 2d 373, 223 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1961) (legacy accepted by
attending college; affirmative acceptance unnecessary).
65. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
67. Cf Note, supra note 47, at 941 n.43 ("Strangely enough, [this] remarkable doctrine
now under discussion has escaped the criticism of eminent authorities.").
68. See supra text accompanying note 65.
69. Recent Decisions, The Wills Branch of the Doctrine of Worthier Title and Renuncia-
tion of a Devise to Escape Creditors: City National Bank v. Andrews [355 So. 2d 341 (Ala.
1978)], 30 ALA. L. REV. 595, 601 (1978).
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ably viewed as a fraudulent transfer, provided it be assumed that
the consideration is of a sort that itself cannot be made available, or
is inadequate, to satisfy creditors' claims.
Outside of these general rule exceptions, the right to renounce
has found support in bald statements that it is an absolute right,7" in
application of statutory provisions for the doctrine of relation
back,7 in recognition of the probable intent of the decedent,72 and
in statutory authorizations of disclaimer73 that do not forbid its ex-
ercise in debtor/creditor situations and by implication, therefore,
ought allow its use absolutely.
A. The Personal and Absolute Right of Renunciation
Recognizing that "the law is certainly not so absurd as to force a
man to take an estate against his will,"'74 courts have long accepted
the "venerable doctrine that an intended recipient of a gift may re-
ject it"7" without regard to the extent of the benefit.76 The doctrine
runs as far back as Roman law.77
There are good reasons for giving effect to the wishes of an un-
willing intended recipient. The person may wish to assert his or her
independence, minimize tax burdens, avoid conditions attached to
the gift, avoid contact with the donor, avoid moral obligation that
may ensue from acceptance, or indeed may wish to hold off credi-
tors. The intended recipient of the gift ought not to be made to
justify his or her refusal to accept at any rate. Though it may not be
"human nature to refuse or reject ... visitations of the fickle god-
dess of fortune,"' 78 the visit is only temporarily to the beneficiary;
the creditor stands by eagerly waiting to usurp her arrival. The
goddess in these instances is not only fickle but may be thought of
as cruel in directing a gift to one who cannot long enjoy its benefits.
The absolute right to renounce is stated unequivocally by a New
York court: a beneficiary "may freely renounce a testate or intes-
70. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
74. Townson v. Tickell, 106 Eng. Rep. 575, 576-77 (K.B. 1819) (Abbot, CJ.). See also
Thompson v. Leach, 86 Eng. Rep. 391, 396 (K.B. 1689) (Ventris, J., dissenting) (one "cannot
have an estate put in him in spight of his teeth").
75. Martin, supra note 23, at 316.
76. Id.
77. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 304-07 (3d ed. 1963); M. RADIN,
HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 399, 410, 422, 459-60 (1927), cited in Martin, supra note 23, at
316.
78. Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 561, 164 P. 1100, 1102 (1917).
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tate disposition for any or no reason, dven if it has the effect, or
indeed, the object, of frustrating creditors .. .
B. The Fiction of Relation Back
By statute, disclaimed gifts and testamentary benefits commonly
"relate back" to the time of donation or death8' and have "the legal
effect of preventing a succession from becoming operative in favor
of the disclaimant."81 Accordingly, title to the property does not
vest in the disclaimant, and the disclaimant has nothing to
convey. 82
Relation back is a well recognized doctrine that is necessary to
give effect to the intent of the disclaimant. Given the application of
presumption of acceptance and of the requirement of acceptance,83
relation back is necessary to effectively rebut the presumption, and
to prevent title from vesting in the disclaimant. Without the doc-
trine of relation back, the centuries-old proscription against forcing
property upon an unwilling recipient84 would be meaningless.
C. Frustration of the Intent of the Decedent
It is a universal maxim that the primary goal of will interpreta-
tion is to realize the intent of the testator.85 When a testator exer-
cises the right to dispose of his or her property as he or she sees fit,
it may be presumed that the testator intends to convey a benefit to
79. In re Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d 204, 207-08, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
80. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 282 (West Supp. 1986). The enactment of this legisla-
tion (formerly § 190.6), expressly endorsing relation back when property is disclaimed, first
cast doubt upon the continuing validity of the holding in In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807,
108 P.2d 401 (1940). Martin, supra note 23, at 320 n.14. The Ohio Supreme Court relied on
Kalt in Stein v. Brown, 18 Ohio St.3d 305, 480 N.E.2d 1121 (1985), at a time when OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1339.60(H) (Baldwin 1978) expressly endorsed relation back for a dis-
claimer, and therefore Kalt may have been a weak leg to stand upon. See supra notes 22-23
and accompanying text.
81. UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL, INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENT ACT
§ 3, 8A U.L.A. 102, 103 (1985) (comment).
82. In People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203, 208, 162 N.E. 848, 850 (1928), the Illinois
Supreme Court stated:
the rule is announced that the renunciation relates back to the moment when the
gift is made, so that the estate does not vest but remains in the original owner,
precisely the same as if the will or deed had never been executed, or passes under
the instrument, according to its terms, to another, and that a renunciation is not a
voluntary conveyance and is not subject to attack by creditors.
(citations omitted).
83. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
85. "The intention of the testator is always the polar star in the construction of wills.
." Biles v. Martin, 288 Ala. 231, 236, 259 So. 2d 258, 262 (1972).
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the named beneficiary. The beneficiary's creditors frustrate this in-
tent by intercepting the benefit. While it may be true that "[t]he
denial to the debtor of the right to renounce as against his creditors
in fact benefits his own economic interests as well as those of his
creditors, '8 6 this is a matter properly for the judgment of the
debtor. Moreover, the economic interests at stake in a disclaimer
situation are not exclusively those of the debtor and the creditor; an
entire family fortune may be imperiled by an unforeseen and unfor-
tunate liability.87 It may also be maintained that the testator, by
leaving property to a named beneficiary, indicated an intent that it
not be renounced, and that giving effect to a renunciation is itself a
defeat of the testator's intent. Outside the context of intestate suc-
cession where, of course, this argument is inapposite, the unwilling-
ness of a beneficiary to accept property must here take precedence
over the testator's intent.
Extending the rule of Kalt and Stein, a creditor of any named
insolvent beneficiary of a will could conceivably control the testa-
tor's estate plan. If a beneficiary's refusal to accept donated prop-
erty may not defeat a creditor's interest, the peculiar result may
follow that a testator's refusal to donate property may likewise be
ineffective as against creditors. Indeed, this improbable proposition
is but a short leap from the many cases allowing creditors to contest
wills from which their debtors have been excluded.8"
D. Renunciation In Accordance With Statutory Provisions
State probate codes commonly include provisions which author-
ize disclaimers.8 9 These provisions usually require a disclaimer to
be in writing, to describe the property disclaimed, to be signed by
the disclaimant,9" and to be filed within a certain time limit. 91 A
definite time limit for renunciation replaces the uncertainty of the
86. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 814, 108 P.2d 401, 404 (1940).
87. See Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037,
1077 (1966).
88. Eg., In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 238 P.2d 992 (1951) (judgment
creditor is "interested person" allowed to contest will which disinherits debtor). See generally
Comment, Can a Judgment Creditor Contest a Will Where the Debtor is Disinherited?, 40
CALIF. L. REv. 451 (1952); Kerson, Creditors and the Will Contest, 14 HASrINGs L.J. 18
(1962); Comment, Lien Creditor Permitted to Contest Will Disinheriting Debtor, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 609 (1952).
89. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
90. Many statutes are patterned after the UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL,
INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENT Acr, 8A U.L.A. 93 (1978). The requirement of a writing is
found in § 1 of the Act.
91. Most statutes specify a nine-month period, as is the provision of id. § 2.
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common law's requirement of a "reasonable period,"92 which led to
divergent holdings.93 Specifying the allowable time accommodates
legitimate claim filings and will contests, allows the certain closing
of probate proceedings, and decreases the risk of an inadvertent ac-
ceptance of a gift by estoppel. 94 When a statute sets out renuncia-
tion procedures, the renunciation that tracks those procedures
should be effective regardless of motive.95
The legislature may be assumed to have before it all relevant
information regarding the policies and uses of the right of renuncia-
tion.9 6 By drafting a statute that authorizes renunciation without
qualification, a legislature evinces a determination that renunciation
to defeat creditors is permissible.97 Legislatures can enact statutes
92. Two state statutes expressly provide that disclaimer must be made within a "reason-
able time" and provide that nine months will be conclusively presumed to be reasonable.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 279 (West 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 120.030 (1981).
93. Note, supra note 47, at 940 n.34 (comparing an ineffective renunciation four months
after testator's death in In re Howe's Estate, 112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163 A. 234 (Prerog. Ct. 1932)
with an effective renunciation eight years after testator's death in McGarry v. Mathis, 226
Iowa 37, 282 N.W. 786 (1938)).
94. UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL, INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENTS ACT,
8A U.L.A. 93, 100, § 2 (comments) (1985).
95. See, e.g., In re Estate of Colacci, 37 Colo. App. 369, 549 P.2d 1096 (1976) (applying
Colorado statute with six-month time limit on renunciation of testamentary gifts); In re Es-
tate of Hansen, 109 Ill. App. 2d 283, 248 N.E.2d 709 (1969) (applying Illinois statute which
sets forth procedures for disclaimer). In a "puzzling case, which the world will little note nor
long remember," In re Detlefsen, 610 F.2d 512, 513 (8th Cir. 1979), the court felt constrained
to allow a disclaimer that operated to defeat a bankrupt's creditors under the then-existing
Bankruptcy Act, which allowed the trustee to take title to "[a]ll property... which vests in
the bankrupt within six months after bankruptcy by bequest, devise or inheritance." 11
U.S.C. § 1 10(a)(5) (1976). The applicable Illinois law was well settled that renunciation re-
lated back to the testator's death, and that disclaimer prevented passage of title to the disclai-
mant. One year after the renunciation, Congress enacted a revised Bankruptcy Act which
provided that the trustee might claim "[a]n interest in property that.. . the debtor acquires
or becomes entitled to acquire . . . by bequest, devise or inheritance." 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(5)(A) (1978). The court acknowledged that "[i]f we were deciding this case under
the new Act, the result might well be different. However, the old Act controls .. " Detlef-
sen, 610 F.2d at 520. See also Estate of Oot, 95 Misc. 2d 707, 408 N.Y.S.2d 303, 306 (Sur. Ct.
1978): "It is with no small degree of reluctance that the court [upholds renunciation to defeat
creditors]. However, until the legislature in its wisdom provides some statutory vehicle for
protecting creditors against frustration of their claims, unfortunate results may again occur."
96. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON ESTATES 257-58
(1964), quoted in Rohan, Practice Commentary to N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-
1.11, at 261 (1981); Estate of Schiffman, 105 Misc. 2d 1025, 1027, 430 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230
(Sur. Ct. 1980) ("It was clear when the renunciation statute and its predecessors were enacted
... that the right to renounce interests in estates would be used primarily for two purposes: to
avoid creditors' claims or to minimize taxes.").
97. Estate of Dankner, 86 Misc. 2d 1081, 1084, 384 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (Erie Sur. 1976)
("If the legislature had desired to protect the interest of the creditors.., it is reasonable to
assume that legislation would have been enacted to provide such protection.").
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that expressly protect creditors when such protection is intended.
For example, at least three state statutes, and the Bankruptcy Code,
expressly subject the right of renunciation to the claims of credi-
tors.98 In other states, where neither the statutes authorizing re-
nunciation nor the fraudulent transfer provisions provide explicit
protection for creditors in a disclaimer situation, the statutes are not
incompatible and should not be read to be so. Disclaimer is not
accurately a transfer of property within the meaning of the fraudu-
lent conveyance statutes.
III. SOME COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Creditor's Reliance on the Testamentary Benefit as a Source
of Repayment
Creditors cannot rely on their debtor's expectancy in a testa-
mentary benefit as a source of repayment.99 The debtor has no
claim to the property before the testator's death; he cannot enjoy it
and cannot hold it out as his own. The creditor must acknowledge
that loans were not made in reliance on the debtor's expectation in
the testamentary benefit, 1" for the expectancy is controlled at the
whim of the testator. If the creditor has chosen to loan on this
inadequate security, that is properly considered poor business judg-
ment 01 and ought not to be redressable by rule of law at the ex-
pense of the testator's succession plan and the other natural objects
of his bounty.
B. Windfall to Creditors
Property passing through testate or intestate succession can be
regarded as a windfall-a "visitation[ ] of the fickle goddess of for-
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.801(6)(a) (West 1976) (as amended by Laws 1977, c.77-87,
§ 15) ("The right to disclaim otherwise conferred by this section shall be barred if the benefi-
ciary is insolvent at the time of the event giving rise to the right to disclaim .... "); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 525.532(6) (West 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.86.060 (1986); 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A) (1983).
99. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
100. See, eg., City Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. Andrews, 355 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala.
1978) ("The bank candidly admits that it did not anticipate nor rely upon any inheritance.");
In re Detlefsen, 610 F.2d 512, 520 (8th Cir. 1979) ("there is no evidence in this case that the
bankrupt's creditors relied on his expectancy in the trust assets in extending credit to him
101. Crumpler v. Barfield & Wilson Co., 114 Ga. 570, 574-75, 40 S.E. 808, 811 (1902)
(Lewis, J., dissenting) ("If the defendants in error loaned money upon insufficient security,
they did so with their eyes open, and they cannot invoke the aid of the courts to protect them
against their own palpable want of foresight.").
1986]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tune."1 °2 Normally, the recipient of the windfall is the named bene-
ficiary in a will, or the heir named by law. When the benefit is
allowably renounced, the recipient becomes the beneficiary of the
rest and residuary clause in the will, or the next taker specified by
the intestacy statute, until the property escheats to the state. 103 In
such a case, is the creditor a deserving potential recipient of the
benefit? Not all creditors of an insolvent beneficiary would be in an
equally advantageous position with regard to the expectancy of a
benefit to the debtor. A contract claim that is known to the testator
could easily be defeated by a revision of the testator's will. Only a
person who holds an unanticipated and possibly fortuitous debt-
e.g., a tort claimant-would typically be able to benefit by the rule
of Kalt and Stein."° In fact, the Model Probate Code,105 promul-
gated in 1946, which subjected the right of renunciation to creditor
and tax claims, was revised to make the right absolute for this very
reason-that these claimants ought not to be able to reach the un-
merited windfall of property which is neither owned nor enjoyed by
their debtors.' °6 This reasoning seems consistent with a testator's
presumed intent to benefit a favored recipient rather than the recipi-
ent's creditor.
IV. CONCLUSION
The renunciation of a testamentary benefit is properly an abso-
lute and private right and is the corollary of the ancient maxim
against forcing property upon anyone. Since an individual may
have valid reasons for refusing a testamentary benefit, restricting
the right of renunciation on the basis of a presumed fraudulent in-
tent to defeat creditors' claims pushes applicable law to an unwar-
ranted extent. Fraudulent transfer law does not address refusal to
accept property. Furthermore, the vast majority of statutes author-
izing renunciation provide no special provision for the protection of
creditors which would force their debtors to accept property. The
statutorily authorized right to renounce ought not to be hampered
by reading into the statute protection for creditors which simply is
not there.
A debtor who renounces a testamentary benefit does not pass a
benefit to another, but instead denies himself the benefit in the first
102. Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 561, 164 P. 1100, 1102 (1917).
103. 6 BOWE-PARKER, supra note 1, § 49.1.
104. See Fratcher, supra note 87, at 1077.
105. MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946).
106. Fratcher, supra note 87, at 1077.
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instance. The well recognized doctrine of relation back works to
prevent title from ever vesting in the disclaimant, and he neither
diminishes his estate nor effects a transfer by renouncing property.
A testate or intestate benefit is a windfall and where creditors'
claims can be anticipated, it becomes a windfall that would nor-
mally be available only to a certain type of creditor-the tort
claimant.
Giving effect to the testator's intent is a strong and forcefully
felt policy of the law of succession. It is an entirely reasonable pre-
sumption that a testator would intend that his or her estate benefit a
favored recipient, and not be directly reachable by the recipient's
creditors. Therefore, by impairing the recipient's ability to disclaim
the testamentary benefit, the law may frustrate the intent of the tes-
tator, contravening the fundamental policy that underlies the law of
succession.
Whatever the morality of deflecting potentially reachable assets
beyond a creditor's grasp, consider that it is equally unpalatable to
effectively charge the ancestor's estate with the beneficiary's debts,
and potentially bankrupt the entire family's fortune. A debtor who
stands to receive a testamentary benefit should be allowed to refuse
that benefit without becoming answerable for a fraudulent transfer.
DEAN DAVID GAMIN
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